

Challenges and Consequences of Managing Primary Elections in Emerging Multiparty Democracies: A Case of Uganda.

Stella Kyohairwe (PhD)
Uganda Management Institute

Abstract

In multiparty democracies, the managing of elections of political representatives is considered as a critical process that determines the quality and policy credibility of the government. Election processes and procedural frameworks should be able to determine selection of competent political candidates with knowledge, integrity and honesty to determine better policy decisions and to ensure a responsive government. To achieve better election outcomes, we need to examine the electoral processes and determine better ways of managing such elections. This study, through interviews and secondary data from three regions in Uganda examined the management of 2016 party primary elections. The findings revealed three key factors influencing the party primaries as failure to follow the key principles and procedures, party structures that are fused with local council system, and the effect of the money culture in politics. Weakening of party cohesion, poor quality policies and a less-responsive political representative are some of the consequences. Evidence from this empirical study on the challenges of managing the primary elections in Uganda and theoretical explanations on primary elections discussed in this paper provide guidance for political parties, the incumbents and prospective politicians, and the general public on management of party elections.

Key words: Primary Elections, Multiparty Democracies, Political Parties, Electoral Processes

Introduction

Concerns of democratising governments are well captured in the existing literature with a global surge and dramatic political changes most felt in the last decade of the 20th century. In United States of America, methods of nominating candidates have evolved overtime in the 20th century. There is much to learn from the electoral processes in Western democracies regarding transformations of party systems, and democratisation wave from 1990s to-date shows a trend where multiparty elections are accommodated and widely accepted through a number of flaws limiting the freedom and fairness of the electoral system. Political parties are critical for democratic institutions because they are vehicles for political representation and participation, and an important channel for maintaining democratic accountability and government responsiveness. Parties are essential for broad-based representative government and translation of society interests into public policies (Dix 1992; Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2014).

There is much to learn from African democratisation experiences especially from dominant one party systems like South Africa and Botswana, in two party systems as in Ghana or in a no-party system like Uganda under the Movement system of governance before 2006. The interest in this paper is not much to do with parties as part of the democratisation process but about the way elections in the party systems are managed and the likely consequences. Uganda

is selected as a case for exploring the management of party elections because of the country's unique experience with party and no-party systems under various regimes since independence. While Uganda has held elections since the time of her independence in 1962, tracking the management of elections under the multiparty system has been problematic due to short-term and turbulent political regimes in post-independence era. At the time of independence in the early post-independence era, Uganda was under a multiparty democracy with Uganda People's Congress (UPC) as the dominant party. The Idi Amin regime of 1970s banned political parties through the 1970s. The ban was lifted in 1980 after the fall of Idi Amin and the country returned to multiparty elections for five years until 1985 when the national army staged a coup d'état and suspended the constitution.

With the coming of National Resistance Movement (NRM) into power in 1986, political parties were suspended and electoral processes under no-party system were based on individual merit and electoral colleges (Uganda Constitution, Kyohairwe 2009) until 2005 when Uganda held a referendum and adopted a multi-party political system. Under the multiparty dispensation, political parties were expected to hold primary elections to select competent candidates who would compete with flag bearers from other parties. Consequently, multiparty elections were organised in 2006, 2011 and 2016 at local and national levels. The managing of primary elections since the multiparty dispensation had a number of challenges which are limited in documentation. While several elections have been held under the multiparty system in Uganda, this study is limited to the 2016 elections with expectation of noting critical recent issues to do with management of elections and for purposes of drawing lessons to inform the subsequent elections. It is expected that the conclusions derived from the study shall offer empirical evidence and theoretical understanding of elections to future researchers, political parties, the incumbent, prospective politicians and the general public.

Research objectives

The study aimed at investigating the challenges of managing the primary elections in Uganda. From the established challenges, the study further examines the consequences of primary elections from the respondents' point of view.

Management of Elections and Political Selection

There is vast literature relating to emerging democracies and relevance of making a conscious selection of political representatives. One such argument raised by Timothy Besely (2005) is that political selection is important for two main reasons: policy credibility and quality of politicians. Following this argument, Besely (2005) holds two core assumptions. First is that "if there are limits on the degree to which individuals can credibly adopt policy positions, then who is picked for public office should be instrumental in adopting a credible policy stance". The second view is that "if the control of politicians through elections is limited, then improving the quality of government requires an increase in the honesty, integrity or competence of those who are elected".

The first assumption reminds us that political representatives are selected to determine a policy direction in relation to what the government should do or not do.

Besely (2005) argues that the complexity arising out of lack of consensual understanding of what the government should do is inevitable because perceptions and preferences of the citizens are quite divergent. Such conflictual ideas may create a dilemma of the representatives being selected to have the same policy direction which may limit diversity and reduce policy credibility.

Another complexity underlying the policy credibility arguments is an assumption that choosing a political party or political representatives is a sign of rational political behaviour. The electoral choice of representatives is often associated with creating a link between the representatives and the represented (Judge, 2014) or what Bühlmann and Kriesi (2013) refer to as political input (the citizens' preferences) and the political output (public policies adopted by the elected representatives). The attempt to match voters' selection of political representatives with preferences of the policy direction in order to determine the policy credibility may suggest a false assumption especially in instances where the voters themselves are not clear (or ignorant) about the expected public policies and their outcomes.

Turning to the second assumption regarding the selection being a prerequisite for the quality of politicians in office, this may be a valid argument where election processes and procedural frameworks create clear yardsticks to determine the required competences for political candidates. To have political competences which in one way or the other is closely associated with having technical competences, is interpreted to mean the ability to skilfully make a decision, to manipulate and/or persuade others (Besley, 2005; Brinkman, 2018). Much earlier literature tries to unpack the term political competences with reference to knowledge, resources and efficacy (Pollock 1983) or capacity to recognize a political question as political and to treat it as such by responding politically (Bourdieu 1984). Arising out of such theoretical arguments, often an attempt to streamline the political selection for quality is approached through measures such as setting minimum education qualifications and payment of nomination fees that are prohibitive to ordinary citizens. However, the controversies may arise where the party gatekeepers have a higher preference for party patronage than potential normative competences. Ideally parties should be sponsoring their candidates at all levels since it is believed that elected officials represent party interests. In emerging democracies however, party members' sponsorship for candidature is many times stifled by the financial constraints.

The matters of honesty and integrity are very important in political selection. Electoral laws and procedures at times underscore the two requirements by clearly stating that the candidates should be of higher integrity. Having integrity is associated with political ethics, politicians adhering to the obligations that official codes of ethics prescribe (Hall, 2018), and substantial literature associates integrity to corruption (Jonathan and Heywood 2013; Hall, 2017;). Honesty mostly is interpreted as being trustable (Mandak 1995; Besley, 2005) which is an important value for both for voters and for self-selection of political candidates (Mondak and Huckfeldt, 2006).

An attempt to discern honesty and integrity and to distinguish them from each other is problematic to an extent that there is a tendency to consider them as moral normative societal values expected of political leaders. They are good foundations for ensuring the political efficacy, a concept which writers of many decades far back refer to as the feeling that

individual political action does have or can have an impact on a political process (Campbell et al, 1954) precisely interpreted as political effectiveness and system responsiveness (Craig & Maggiotto 1982).

The above debate on selection of political representatives based on Besley's two major determinants i.e policy credibility and quality of politicians, is in itself an indication that the two reasons are inadequate to explain why some political candidates are selected as party representatives and others left out. Lack of proper measurement of attributes like honesty and integrity, and the divergent perceptions and preferences of the citizens on policy credibility render raised arguments for political selection deficient. It might therefore be more reasonable to look into an alternative explanation from the existing political recruitment assumptions.

Models for Political Recruitment

Within existing scholarly works, occasionally conflicting arguments are found on the use of two terminologies - theory and model. Whereas political selection has wide scholarship, this study found two models - *the responsible party government model* and *the district delegate model* by Pippa Norris (1996) most appropriate. Incidentally some writers use the term theory and models interchangeably. In presenting and discussing these two models, this paper uses the word "model" for consistency purposes.

In the *responsible party government model*, voters are given the choice of alternative party platform or elections and individual candidates are regarded as members of their collective organisations. Norris argues that under such a model, who stands for elections is less important than what their party stands for and she relates this condition to be manifesting in democracies characterised by high degree of discipline.

Norris's model is consistent with the classic work of Austin Ranney (1954), *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* in which Ranney observes that the ideal party government should work such that if it is in power, at the next election, the people should be able to decide whether or not they approve of a general direction that party has been undertaking. "If the answer is yes, then they return that party to power; and if the answer is no then they replace it with the opposition party (Ranney, 1954). In affirmation to the Mayhew (1974) views, Jones and McDermott believe that if voters adopt this behaviour, there is a likelihood that members of the party will cooperate in order to accomplish collective policy goals and if not then individuals in government are likely to serve their own interest at the expense of collective good.

The second model is the *district delegate model* where according to Norris, elected members are seen primarily as agents of geographical areas, from which they are elected than their party organisations. This model is characterised by less collective responsibility for government but rather is inclined to social representation based on simple grounds of equity regarding salient cleavages like gender, ethnicity, class, race and the like (Norris, 1996). Norris's district delegate model is agreeable with *Delegate Theory of Representation* advanced by Donald J. McCrone and James H. Kuklinski (1979), which posits that the representative ought to reflect purposively the preferences of his constituents.

The delegate theory of representation assumes that political representatives fulfil

two conditions: 1) The representative must believe himself to be obliged to behave in accordance with constituency preferences and 2) The constituency must organize and express its preferences in a way that allows the representative to develop a reasonably accurate perception of constituency opinion. Assumption one therefore suggests that a representative is selected as a delegate, has no role of his or her own but should “act for” those who select the representative. This further suggests that there should be a component of substantiveness – what is represented. The second condition suggests a relationship between the represented and the representatives. Therefore, to be selected, a representative should have characteristics of people making the selection, the representative should be like them, share similarities in character and attributes. Representation in the second condition therefore should “mirror” who is represented. These debates are extensively discussed in the classic works of Hanna K. Pitkin (1972) on the Concept of Representation (Kyohairwe 2009).

Methodology

Different categories of respondents were selected from across three geographical regions of Uganda. From the three regions, five polling officials were selected purposively with a view that their experiences in the election process would inform the study. The selected political candidates involved the losers and the winners of the 2016 primaries. The category of voters included campaign managers, candidates, agents and any other citizens that never run for political offices in these primaries.

Using qualitative case study design, the research focused on the 2016 primary election phenomenon in Uganda. The study was done qualitatively with a multi-method data collection technique including observations, interviews, and document reviews. Being purely qualitative in nature, the study aimed at understanding the voters and election officials’ view-points based on their experience in primary elections participation. Interpretive methods of analysis were applied to narrations and explanations from the respondents. Content analysis of an excerpt interview about elections experiences with one of the prominent politicians was also used. The study carried out in-depth interviews from 30 respondents including voters, electoral officials and political candidates. The political candidates selected purposively, conveniently and by use of snowball techniques included those who were defeated at primary elections and those who managed to go through the elections successfully. Drawing samples from different regions (Mid-Western, Eastern, and Central Uganda) was intended to establish and corroborate the opinions of the respondents on the primary electoral processes across the three regions. In mid-western region (referred to as western in this study), respondents were selected from Mityana and Mubende districts. Eastern region respondents were from Mbale, Bulambuli and Buduuda. Respondents from the central region were drawn from Kampala and Mpigi district.

Questions set for respondents in an interview schedule covered a broad spectrum of issues that explored the level of the electoral process that individual respondents participated in and in which capacities. For the contestants who lost in the elections and incumbents, their reasons for joining politics were explored. The broad and specific questions also focused on the political parties that these individuals belonged to and their own views on the way the primary elections were conducted. The respondents were also asked what they considered as consequences of such processes. On a smaller scale, apart from primary data obtained from interviews, anecdotal information was used to augment the face to face interviews carried out

by the researcher.

The data obtained from interviews and other secondary sources were coded, presented and analysed as given in the study findings section. Characteristics of the respondents involved in this study, their roles or positions of responsibility in the party primary elections, and their personal views on the primary elections were explored. The data from different sources was triangulated to derive a deeper meaning that informed the discussions and conclusions of the study.

The Findings

We begin by looking at the characteristics of the respondents by gender and qualification. Subsequent sections depict the nature of selected participants to the study. Presentation of the individual characteristics helps us to understand the selection process on the basis of different categories of the population. The background information for the respondents focused on their gender, the regional differentiation, and on political party affiliation. The respondent categories included the voters, electoral officials and political candidates. Electoral officials were those who served as polling officials during the party primary elections either as presiding officers or polling assistants. These classifications are presented in the figures and tables below.

Respondents by Gender

Overall 13 out of the 30 respondents interviewed were female. Of the thirty respondents selected for this study the majority of the respondents amongst the voters were women and the least number were male respondents among the electoral officials category. The political candidates were more or less balanced in terms of gender. The summary of respondents' gender is presented in figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Respondents classification by gender

The blending of gender for the respondents as indicated in Figure 1 above was crucial to ensure that views of men and women about the selection process of party candidates are captured. This speaks to the gendered politics of Uganda where the constitution provides for women quotas political recruitment processes at all legislative levels. This speaks to the gendered politics of Uganda where the constitution provides for women quotas in the political recruitment process at all legislative levels. However, the gender recruitment issues never featured prominently in the data on party recruitment.

Correspondents by Region

The selection of respondents from all the 3 regions was balanced. This was meant to ensure that views from each region were obtained without possible errors emerging from the respondents' size. The summary of the respondents selected from each region is presented in table 1 below.

Table 1: Respondents Classification by region

Characteristics	CENTRAL	EAST	WEST	Total	% share
Voters	4	6	6	16	53%
Electoral Officials	2	3		5	17%
Political Candidates	4	1	4	9	30%
Total	10	10	10	30	100%

Table 1: Respondents' Classification by region

As observed from Table 1 above, respondents' categories numerically varied from region to region. No official from the Western region was included in this study because those identified for the study had busy schedules. We could also not access those purposively selected and it was not possible to conveniently reach any of the officials in this region as anticipated. Nevertheless the rest of the selected respondents in the Western and other regions were able to give sufficient insights in the 2016 primary elections for political parties in Uganda.

Party affiliation of the Respondents

Affiliation of political party was considered important in this study reason being that respondents from different parties had different experiences regarding their respective primary elections. Nevertheless the rest of the selected respondents in the Western and other regions were able to give sufficient insights in the 2016 primary elections for political parties in Uganda. The summary of selected respondents is presented in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Respondents by party affiliation and by gender

In Figure 2, it is evident that majority of respondents were NRM voters comprising of 60% of all respondents. FDC had few respondents but nearly evenly distributed across gender and other categorical classification as electoral officials, political candidates and voters. From other political parties, respondents were balanced in gender with 2 respondents from the political candidates' category and 2 other respondents from voters' category. None of the other parties except NRM and FDC had a respondent among the electoral officials' category and this may be explained by the party size where NRM is the dominant party with 69% of the respondents followed by FDC with 19% of the total respondents.

The electoral process

Among the two dominant parties NRM and FDC, the NRM primary electoral process was more known to the respondents, partly because it was a majority party associated with the sitting government and had much more defined structures at the grassroots compared to other parties. The NRM primary elections were held between 27th October and 18th November 2015, in line with the party constitution which provides for the election of flag bearers for various elective positions at all levels in the party. The party primaries were also part of the road map to prepare for its participation in the 2016 general elections. The elections were held for various elective positions including Mayors, Local Government Chairpersons and Members of Parliament. The voting process required verification of voter eligibility at the polling stations by use of NRM members' register known as Yellow Book or party cards. The constitution of National

Resistance Movement, as amended in 2010 details the party structures and processes.

FDC Party constitution of 2015 offers guidelines for the party primaries to be proposed by one member of the electoral college seconded by five members. To contest for primaries held in October 2015, FDC candidates had to be registered voters and card holding members of the party, aged above 30 but below 75 years old. Competing in respective sub-counties, municipalities, towns and divisions also required that the candidate is a resident of the area or has made undertakings with the electoral commission that within six months, they will have established a residence there. These and other party structures and processes are detailed in the party constitution.

Reasons for participating in party politics

Respondents were asked a general question on why people join the electoral politics at the primary level or higher levels. Responses obtained included: availability of the political post, defiance of the party’s interests and politicians, party ideology, grudge with another party, and desire for serving people. These are presented in Figure 3 below




Figure 3. Interviewees’ views on why contestants stand in party politics

The findings that show the majority respondents arguing in favor of party ideology as a key selection criteria in party primaries suggest that party goals influence the voter choices. “You have to participate in order to choose a candidate who stands for your principles as a party” (a voter from the central region). Another respondent from the same region however had a different view that: “In multiparty system, primary elections are mandatory. Someone must stand to fill the existing slots”.

While there are candidates who stand for serving the electorate wishes, amazingly, some respondents considered an argument to do with the grudge or disagreements they have with opposition parties or with their own party leadership. It occurred from the responses that a

candidate stands because of the urge to ensure that the opposition party members do not take the post as one respondent from the Eastern district of Mbale stressed; “People join parties because they are only defiant but not because of the parties’ interests. They detest the unfair support of party leadership for some candidates against others within the same party.

The finding that show the majority respondents arguing in favour of party ideology as a key selection criteria in party primaries suggests that party goals influence the voter choices. These findings therefore could be explained by The Responsible Party Government Model, where voters are given the choice of alternative party platform or elections and individual candidates are regarded as members of their collective organisations (Pippa Norris 1996). The fact that there are also many candidates who stand for elections because they have a grudge with the other party suggests a spirit of supporting and defending the candidates’ own party as collectivist, a form of behaviour that Mayhew (1974) and Jones and McDermott (2004) believe in.

Hitches in the party primary elections in Uganda

Interviews conducted with voters, political contestants and electoral officials revealed inter-related perceptions held on primary elections in Uganda. Three key factors emerging prominently in the study findings include: a) Failure to follow the key principles and procedures governing primary elections; b) challenges within party structures; and c) Money culture in politics.

Failure to follow the key principles and procedures governing primary elections

The issues of failure to adhere to election procedures were critical and a big challenge to the party primaries. One of the respondents who participated as a candidate in the NRM primary elections for parliamentary seat pointed out a number of factors that brought challenges in the NRM ruling party primary elections. He stressed two points: NRM failure to a) assess the popularity of the party and; b) assess the popularity of the individuals being fielded to run for the party positions. To stress the second point, he stated:

If the other candidate is more popular, then you also need to elect a popular candidate. You also need to compare the registered voters and identify the possible voters likely to vote your candidate... this was missing because there was a lot of external influence for one to be voted for. (Respondent from the Eastern region)

In a disappointed tone, a seemingly staunch candidate supporter and voter from the central region stated,

NRM rushed to stop those who had not passed through primary elections to stand as independents in order to protect the flag bearers. I do not think this was a good thing for the party... some of the flag bearers were not popular and we eventually lost out in some areas. (Central region interviewee)

This voter made reference to particular cases who had intended to stand as independents after being defeated in the primaries to become flag bearers. While interviewing respondents from the Western region, I raised the question about independent candidates to one respondent who in affirmation said:

In my view I would say that there was a fear that given an opportunity, the independents could out-compete the party selected flag bearers. Otherwise if you are strong, why would you fear competition? (Western region interviewee).

Arguments on principles and procedures governing party primary elections indicated in the practice of party primaries here is reflective of the Responsible Party Government Model advanced by Norris, P. (1996). This is a model where according to Norris, who stands for elections is less important than what their party stands for. The views of the respondents also relate to The Doctrine of the Responsible Party Government of Austin Ranney (1954) whose argument is that the ideal party government should work such that if it is in power, at the next election, the people should be able to decide whether or not they approve of a general direction that the party has been undertaking and either return that party to power or replace it with the opposition party. It suggests that rather than blocking of the opposition candidates to stand, which in itself doesn't make a party strong, NRM as a ruling party could work onto the party procedures and principles to influence the voter behaviour so that, as Jones and McDermott (2001) argue, members of the party cooperate in order to accomplish collective policy goals. A focus on party collective goals is capable of cementing party cohesion and strength to enable members easily win elections.

In a newspaper excerpt (Saturday Vision, April 2, 2016) there is much to corroborate the views of the above cited respondents and those of an MP contestant who failed in primary elections as put in the excerpt below:

Reporter: Your defeat shocked many who thought you were a powerful figure in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and kingmaker of Rukungiri District

Politician: I was shocked, too. Now I know that there were many underhand activities before and during elections. But I still accepted results for many reasons I will not discuss here. Some of these reasons are very important for my people, my party and my country.

Reporter: Did electoral commission (EC) rig you, for example?

Politician: *While the electoral commission had the responsibility to ensure that everything was free and fair, I believe what went wrong was beyond just electoral commission. First, we had some internal party divisions that threatened the fabric of our campaign. Then we had religious leaders leading the flock the sectarian path. We also had the opportunists who are loyalists, who kept changing with the weather. We had misled youth who were easily manipulated. We also had misled party members who are still yet to understand and appreciate the importance of holding the party interest over individual ones. I also feel that our voter population allowed themselves to be distracted from the real pertinent issue. We can no longer afford to vote or give support based on religion or tribe. My intent is to weed these evils out. Uganda should vote on pertinent issues. They should value loyalty to party. They should argue with logic, not emotion, and inject their passion in delivery.*

We have young people whose mindsets we must take care of more seriously than ever before. Instead of us contesting on our promise and track record, the rules of the game were changed. That, in summary is what went wrong.

The excerpt above gives an overall summary of the hiccups on the principles of primary elections especially in NRM party. Importantly however, the arguments clearly depict Timothy Besely's assumption (2005) that political selection is important for policy credibility and quality of politicians. The complexities of irrational political behaviour of voters raised earlier in the literature review regarding policy credibility and the mismatch of political input (the citizens' preferences) versus the political output (public policies adopted by the elected representatives) as advanced by Bühlmann and Kriesi, (2013) emerge in these findings. If the primary elections do not follow pertinent issues, do not take into account the track record of the contestants, and if the rules of the games are changed in the course of election process then the competences for political candidates that are finally selected are contestable. The quality of representatives regarding expected knowledge, resources and efficacy (Pollock 1983) or capacity to recognize a political question as political and to treat it as such by responding politically (Bourdieu 1984) becomes missing. As such the quality of political representatives and the emerging policy credibility are at stake.

Challenges of Party Structures

Party structures are very crucial in the election of political representatives right from the primaries. One of the respondents in the eastern region mentioned that the problem of party primaries were largely structural and pointed out that the structures in place currently favour the NRM government that is in power. Referring to the local council (LC) structures, he observed:

Look at the LC system for instance. From LC1 to LC5, all the structures are a creation of the Movement which has been in power for the last 30 years. Those who occupy those positions are part of the NRM... the structures are simply historical. (Eastern region interviewee)

Another respondent from the Western region regarded the current politics in Uganda as being still "immature". He blamed the current majoritarian electoral system where only one seat per constituency exist and a system in which only one candidate with majority votes can be elected. Unlike in the proportionality representation system where major and minor parties gain legislative seats in pre-determined proportionality, in Uganda's party system the winner takes it all. His argument on political immaturity was linked to the tendency of the NRM party in power totally marginalising the rest. He categorically stated:

Unfortunately, even the current government is not promoting the multiparty system. It is still the same situation as the one of 1980s where UPC party totally side-lined the other parties... If the government was willing, they would be supporting and facilitating the other parties to establish their structures (Western Region male respondent)

Other respondents' views were agreeable on the fact that NRM does not create levelled ground for other parties from village to the district and national level and therefore it makes it difficult for opposition parties' mobilisation activities. This tendency may perpetuate a one-party syndrome within a multiparty democracy.

Money culture in politics

Other views on what went wrong in party primaries indicated that there was improper use of money in the entire electoral process including the primaries. One of the respondents regarded this vice as “disastrous” and condemned the act of giving money to the voters as well as to those involved in the electoral process. His own opinion was,

Naturally you shouldn't be giving people money to vote you. The money should be to facilitate the process of election. It should be for posters, transport and other logistics, not votes. (respondent from central region).

The opinion of one candidate from an opposition party in the Eastern region was that the use of money and winning elections on that basis is deceptive popularity. Reiterating the argument on money culture effect, he further said, “...take away the money, you don't see the power of the candidates”.

The candidate reported that during the NRM elections, the village party members, parish coordinators, sub-county team, district and national task force were all given money during the electoral process.

Relatedly, a respondent from the western region, while giving her experience on the primary elections stressed that those who nominate candidates for flag bearer positions of the party are not defined. To her, choice of flag bearers is influenced by a bunch of critical factors among which is the tendency to choose candidates based on money, resisting choices of party leadership, and segregative support of candidates by top politicians. Accordingly, the candidate who is able to “dish out” more money is the most favoured by the electorate. A more pathetic argument from most of the respondents on the money view is that at times the money given to voters was “very small”, as little as one thousand Uganda shillings or the equivalent in terms of goods in kind like a piece of soap or a kilogram of sugar.

Even if it is ten thousand shillings, for sure, what can such money help you if you selected a wrong candidate? We have heard those politicians who fail to come back to their constituencies to fulfil their promises. Sometimes they say, 'we bought our votes' (central region interviewee).

Interviewees' responses on consequences of party primaries confirm the fears about money politics. Respondents pointed out that the precedent of financial political culture will force the parties to invest money heavily in the subsequent elections. This was considered as a huge test to the emerging party democracies like Uganda because only candidates with money to pay voters will often be elected. Money exchange during elections was considered a future challenge of representation where the elected councillors and parliamentarians will continuously be less responsive to the electorates. As one respondent argued,

Politicians have bought the vote, you have been paid in return....soap, sugar, salt, these petty things... even money in cash. so how can the voter ask for any services? How can they hold their councillors accountable, or their members of parliament? (Central region interviewee)

Reflectively, I relate the money culture arguments above to Timothy Besely's (2005) view on the importance of political selection. The issues raised by the respondents about the “buying

of voters” have a great implication of policy credibility and quality of politicians in regard to their honesty and competence. If money is a prerequisite for a political office, we risk having a big compromise on the calibre of representatives selected in the party primaries who find their way into the legislatures where policy options and debates require their input. The policy outcomes become compromised simply due to limited honesty, integrity and competency of political representatives in political arenas.

The theoretical interpretation of the money culture amongst political contestants is closely associated with the District Delegate Model where elected members are seen primarily as agents of geographical areas from which they are elected than their party organisations. Rather than having a collective responsibility for party objectives, the representatives mirror themselves as delegates, being duty-bound to “act for” and subsequently account to their constituencies. The challenge of the Delegate Theory of Representation which assumes that the representatives purposively reflect the preferences of their constituents (McCrone & Kuklinski, 1979), emerges where those representatives that are selected “fraudulently” can only be held accountable to the citizens through voting which occurs in the subsequent elections in a couple of years. Moreover even if a representative does not serve the wishes of the voters, with the money culture there is no guarantee that they will be defeated during the next elections.

Conclusions

This study revealed that three key factors influence party primaries. First is the failure to follow the key principles and procedures governing primary elections within the political parties. Party leaders need to assess the popularity of the party and that of the individuals being fielded to run for the party positions. Candidate selection should follow pertinent issues, take into account the track record of the contestants, and rules of the games should be constant for all candidates throughout the electioneering and voting period. If this is observed, there will be minimal defiance tendencies of the candidates who decide to stand as independent candidates after they have been defeated within the party which subsequently affects party cohesion.

Secondly, the main challenge of party structures is the current local council system that is a creation of the incumbent NRM party and is owned and controlled by NRM. This limits the rest of the parties’ capacity to mobilize at the grassroots and may perpetuate a one-party syndrome within a multiparty democracy.

Thirdly, the issue of money culture in politics was found to have distorted the elections. The practice of giving money to voters in exchange for votes is said to have a great implication on credibility of elections and quality of politicians in regard to their honesty and competence.

The anticipated consequences of money culture include the poor policy outcomes and poor service delivery. There is also a potential risk to perpetuate less responsive political representatives and incurring hefty investments in subsequent elections. This may not only be limited to the individual parties but it might affect the entire electoral process. These are

issues that the government, party leadership, the electoral commission and the public should appreciate in order to improve the management of subsequent party primary elections in Uganda.

References

- Alvarez, R. M., Thad, E. H., & Hyde, S. D. (2008). Introduction: Studying Election Fraud. In R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Susan D. Hyde (eds) *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation* (pages 1-17). Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Atkeson, L.R., & Saunders, K.L. (2007). The effect of election administration on voter confidence: A local matter. *Political Science and Politics*, 40(4): 655-660
- Besely, T. (2005). Political Selection. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3) Pages 43–60
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Brinkmann, M. (2018). The Concept of Political Competence. *Critical Review*, 30 (3-4), 163-193, DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2018.1572974
- Bühlmann, M., and Kriesi, H. (2013). Models for Democracy. In H. Kriesi, S. Lavenex, F. Esser, J. Matthes, M. Bühlmann and H. D. Bochsler (eds) *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization* (155-176). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Campbell, A. (1954). *The voter decides*. Evanston, Ill: Row, Peterson.
- Craig, S. C., & Maggioro, M.A. (1982). Measuring Political Efficacy. *Political Methodology*, 8 (3) (1982), pp. 85-109
- Dalton, R. J., Farrell, D. M., and McAllister, I. (2011). *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, J.W. (1997). Primary debates. In *U.S. Presidential Primaries and the Caucus Convention System: A Sourcebook* (146-156) Westport, UK: Praeger.
- Diamond, L. J., Linz, J. J., & Lipset, S. M. (1995). *Politics in developing countries: Comparing experiences with democracy*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.
- Dix, R. (1992). Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties. *Comparative Political Studies*, 24 (4), 488–511.
- Doorenspleet, R., & Nijzink, L. (2014). Do Party Systems Matter for Democracy in Africa?. In: Doorenspleet R., Nijzink L. (eds) *Party Systems and Democracy in Africa*. London UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Enelow, J. M., and Hinich, M. (1984). *The spatial theory of elections*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Erickson, L. (1997). Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in a Global Perspective. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds). Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996, pp. xi, 428. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 30(4), 759–760. <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900016619>
- Grofman, B. (1985). The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue Voting. *The Journal of Politics*, 47, 230–237

- Gunter, R., Diamandouros, P.N., & Puhle, H. J. (1995). *Southern Europe in Comparative perspective*. Baltimore USA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hall, E. (2018). Integrity in democratic politics. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 20 (2), 395-408
- Iversen T. (1994). The Logics of Electoral Politics: Spatial Directional and Mobilizational Effects. *Comparative Political Studies* [e-journal], 27(2), 155-189 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414094027002001>
- Jonathan, R., & Heywood, P.M. (2013) Political Science Approaches to Integrity and Corruption. *Human Affairs* 23, 148–159
- Jones, D. R., and McDermott, M. L. (2004). The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48 (1) 1–12
- Judge, D. (2014). *Democratic Incongruities: Representative Democracy in Britain*. Houndmills UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kyohairwe, S. (2009). *Gendering Political Institutions in Uganda: Opportunities, Significance and Challenges of Women in Local Politics*. University of Bergen, Norway.
- LeDuc, L., Niemi, P., & Norris, P. (1996). *Introduction: The present and future of democratic elections. Comparing Democracies*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Lewis, J. B., King, G. (1999). No Evidence on Directional vs. Proximity Voting. *Political Analysis* 8 (1), 21–33
- Mondak, J. J. (1995). Competence, integrity, and the electoral success of congressional incumbents. *The Journal of Politics*, 57(4), 1043–1069
- Mondak, J. J., & Huckfeldt, R. (2006). The accessibility and utility of candidate characterion electoral decision making. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1), 20–34
- Matthews, S. A. (1979). A Simple Direction Model of Electoral Competition. *Public Choice*, 34 (2), 141–156
- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley and Los Angeles USA: University of California Press.
- Pollock, P. H. (1983). The Participatory Consequences of Internal and External Political Efficacy: A Research Note. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 36(3), 400-409
- Rabinowitz, G., and Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *American Political Science Review* 83, 93–12
- Ranney, A. (1954). *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State*. Urbana, USA: The University of Illinois Press.
- Republic of Uganda (1995). *The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda*.
- Thomas, P. G. (1976). David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, pp. vii, 194. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 9(1), 161–162. <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900043493>
- Kahaka, U. (2016, April 2). Interview with Jim Muhwezi: My Loss Was Due To Underhanded Methods. *The New Vision*. Retrieved from https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1417921/hail-jim-muhwezi-doing-unthinkable