Anti-corruption Institutional Multiplicity Façade in Uganda

Abstract

This article uses a comparative analytical approach to examine critically how and why anti-corruption institutional multiplicity has failed to effectively curb corruption in Uganda. The government of Uganda deliberately created several anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption simultaneously in the country; an approach some scholars have argued can be effective as different agencies complement and support one another in the fight against corruption. However, contrary to expectations, having several anticorruption agencies has failed to curb corruption in Uganda effectively and instead resulted in wasteful duplication of functions, uncoordinated way of doing things, blame games, lack of implementing powers, dispersion of limited financial resources, ineffective supervision, corruption within anti-corruption agencies, conflicts, and neglect of corruption cases. The main argument threaded in this article is that most anti-corruption agencies have failed to curb corruption in Uganda effectively because of having been deliberately created, structured, supervised, resourced, empowered in a poor way; and lack of political will from the top political leadership to fight corruption. The article recommends that government should consider scrapping or merging some of the anticorruption agencies, especially those with duplicated roles; avail sufficient financial and human resources to the remaining anti-corruption agencies; and, empower them to enact their recommendations.